ESSAY
COMPLEX TAX LEGISLATION IN THE
TURBOTAX ERA
Lawrence Zelenak*
When tax returns were prepared with pencil and
paper—in an era now gone forever—Congress did not
impose income tax provisions of great computational
complexity on large numbers of taxpayers, in the belief that
it was unreasonable to require average taxpayers (or their
paid preparers) to struggle with computationally complex
provisions. As return preparation software gradually
replaced the pencil in recent decades, the complexity
constraint weakened and eventually disappeared.
Congress has responded by imposing unprecedented
computational complexity on large numbers of taxpayers—
primarily through the expanded scope of the alternative
minimum tax and the proliferation of phase outs of credits,
deductions, and exclusions. This response would not be
problematic, if the only objection to computational
complexity were the difficulty of performing the
calculations—a difficulty overcome by the widespread
adoption of software. Unfortunately, computationally
complex provisions generally constitute bad tax policy,
even apart from computational concerns. For taxpayers
faced with a welter of computationally complex provisions,
the income tax is a black box, the inner workings of which
are beyond their comprehension. This undermines both the
political legitimacy of the tax system and the ability of
taxpayers to engage in informed tax planning. In response
to the demise of the complexity constraint, argues this
Essay, Congress should develop a self-imposed constraint
against the enactment (or survival) of computationally
complex provisions of widespread applicability.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past thirty years, computer software has revolutionized the
preparation of federal income tax returns. 1 When all returns were prepared
by hand, Congress was greatly constrained in its ability to impose
computationally complex provisions on large numbers of taxpayers.
Taxpayers preparing their own returns would have objected vociferously to
the computational burden. Taxpayers resorting to paid preparers would
have objected to the price demanded by paid preparers to wrestle with
complexity. Even return preparation firms might have objected—despite
the increased demand for their services—if they could not find enough
employees able to perform the required calculations.
With few returns now prepared by hand, however, the
computational complexity constraint on the income tax rules applicable to
large numbers of taxpayers has virtually disappeared. With only a few
Luddites clinging to their pencils, and with computers available to perform
calculations of any degree of complexity in milliseconds, the practicalities
of return preparation impose virtually no limitations on the computational
complexity to which Congress may subject the average taxpayer. To be
clear: Software provides only modest assistance in handling complexity in
record keeping and data entry, but once the data are entered there are no
complexity constraints concerning how the tax rules may instruct the
computers to slice and dice the data to produce tax bills. If Congress wants
to subject millions of taxpayers to multiple overlapping phase-outs of
various deductions and credits, if Congress wants to impose the alternative
minimum tax on half the taxpaying population, or if Congress desires tax

1. For the history of the introduction and adoption of return preparation software, see
infra notes 2–13 and accompanying text.
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rate schedules featuring hundreds of different marginal tax rates, it can now
achieve its goals. In the TurboTax era, mere computational complexity
does not rule out any legislative innovation.
Whether this is a boon or a curse is debatable. On the boon side, it
may be possible to identify substantively attractive but computationally
complex tax reforms, which would have been impractical in the pencil-andpaper era, but which can and should be enacted in the age of TurboTax. On
the curse side, however, it may be that computationally complex tax rules
are usually bad rules for reasons other than mere computational complexity,
that the complexity constraint of bygone days served a valuable function by
preventing the enactment of such rules, and that Congress may respond to
the elimination of the constraint by enacting a myriad of computationally
complex and substantively indefensible provisions. Worse yet, perhaps
Congress has already so responded.
Part I of this Essay offers a brief history of how return preparation
software routed the humble pencil. Part II considers whether the
elimination of the computational complexity constraint might lead to the
enactment of substantively desirable tax policies that were previously
impractical. It concludes that the theoretical possibility exists, but that it is
frustratingly difficult to identify any concrete examples. Part III considers
whether the disappearance of the complexity constraint has facilitated the
enactment of tax rules that are objectionable apart from their computational
complexity. It argues that provisions of major computational complexity
and widespread applicability usually constitute bad tax policy even when
computers are available to do all the number crunching. Such provisions
render the take system opaque to the average taxpayer, making it
impossible for taxpayers to evaluate whether their tax liabilities are
generated by a fair set of rules, and making it impossible for taxpayers to
engage in informed tax planning. It concludes that the elimination of the
complexity constraint has led to the enactment of a number of objectionable
provisions, and that it will continue to do so unless Congress succeeds in
replacing the complexity constraint with self-restraint. Part IV considers
mandatory “tax complexity analyses” of current law and of proposed
legislation, which Congress has required since 1998. It argues that this
structural reform has had little or no effect in constraining complexity, and
that there is no reason to expect it to be any more effective in the future.
Part IV is a brief conclusion. It contends that what is needed is not
structural reform, but a basic change in attitudes—in hearts and minds—
among the members of Congress. This may be too much to hope for—but
if it is, then there is no hope. The conclusion urges Congress to adopt, in
the place of the complexity constraint, an informal presumption against the
enactment (or survival) of computationally complex provisions of
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widespread applicability, on the grounds that such provisions generally
constitute bad tax policy even when software is available to handle all the
computations.
I. RETURN PREPARATION SOFTWARE: A BRIEF HISTORY
The earliest tax return preparation software was developed by a
handful of small
companies in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 2 The early adopters
were overwhelmingly paid preparers, rather than taxpayers preparing their
own returns. For example, in 1982 Jackson Hewitt—now the nation’s
second largest tax preparation service, but then just a small business in
Virginia—took the radical step of using self-developed software to prepare
all its customers’ returns. 3 By 1987, about a quarter of all paid preparer
returns were being produced on computers. 4 Newspaper and magazine
stories about the possibility of self-preparers using software did not appear
until 1983. 5 Data do not exist on the extent of software use by selfpreparers in the 1980s, but according to a leading expert on the growth of
the use of return preparation software “[i]t is reasonable to infer that very
few self-preparers used software” even towards the end of the decade. 6
The greatest growth in the use of return preparation software
occurred from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. Only 13% of all individual
returns had been prepared on computers in 1987, 7 but 67% of all returns for
tax year 1997 were computer-prepared. 8 This included 87% of paid
preparer returns and 45% of self-prepared returns. 9 Much of the growth in
2. Don Nunes, Computer Programs Aid Tax Return Preparation, WASH. POST, Feb.
14, 1983, at 23.
3. Daniel B. Grunberg, Case Study: Information Technology at Jackson Hewitt Tax
Service, 15 J. OF CONSUMER MARKETING 282, 283 (1998).
4. Eric Toder, Changes in Tax Preparation Methods, 1993-2003, 107 TAX NOTES
759, 759 (2005) (reporting that 13% of all 1987 returns were prepared on computers, that
48% of all individual taxpayers used paid preparers, and that “very few” self-preparers used
software).
5. Nunes, supra note 2; Ellen Benoit, The Tax Preparation Revolution, FORBES, Jan.
17, 1983, at 69. More stories appeared the following year. David E. Sanger, Software for
Doing Your Own Return, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1984, at 76; John W. Hazard, Doing Your
Taxes by Computer, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 19, 1984, at 86; William D.
Marbach, Now, the Electronic Tax Man, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 19, 1984, at 106.
6. Toder, supra note 4, at 759 (Toder’s comment refers specifically to 1987).
7. Id. at 759.
8. Data Release, Taxpayer Usage Study, 1997, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN 131,
131 (Summer 1998).
9. Author’s calculations, based on id. at 135 tbl.1. Of all individual returns for 1997,
54% were prepared by paid preparers, and 46% by taxpayers themselves. Author’s
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software use during this period was attributable to the pencil-to-software
transition by industry giant H&R Block. Block did not use return
preparation software at all until 1990, 10 and did not complete the transition
to software until 1993. 11
By tax year 2006 (the most recent year for which data are
available), 89% of all individual returns were prepared on computers. 12
This included 98% of paid preparer returns and 71% of self-prepared
returns. 13 In light of the seemingly inexorable trend, it is very likely that
the data for returns for tax year 2008, when they become available, will
indicate that fewer than one return in ten is now being prepared using pencil
and paper.
II. SUBSTANTIVELY ATTRACTIVE COMPUTATIONALLY COMPLEX
PROVISIONS: MORE THAN A THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY?
It is not necessarily a bad thing that tax return computational
complexity no longer serves as a constraint on federal income tax
legislation. Perhaps there are some tax reform proposals lurking in the
wings, which in the pre-TurboTax era would have been too computationally
complex to enact, but which would have been good tax policy apart from
their computational complexity. If so, tax return preparation software has
now overcome the complexity problem, and the proposals can and should
be enacted. The story of the demise of the Rule of 78s in the wake of the
widespread availability of financial calculators provides an analogy. Before
the availability of inexpensive financial calculators, the IRS permitted
taxpayers to calculate interest by the inaccurate-but-easy-to-apply Rule of
78's. 14 In 1982 Hewlett-Packard introduced the HP 12C, the world’s first

calculations, based on id. at 135 tbl.1.
10. H&R Block, Inc., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (reporting that Block “field tested”
return preparation software in two company-owned districts and a small number of franchise
operations in 1990).
11. H&R Block, Inc., 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (“For the first time, our income tax
services in the U.S. were fully automated in fiscal 1993, enabling us to provide
computerized tax returns to virtually all of our clients.”).
12. Internal Revenue Service, Tax Year 2006 Taxpayer Usage Study, Report 16,
available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=184856,00.html (last visited Feb. 14,
2010).
13. Author’s calculations, based on id. Of all individual returns for 2006, 63% were
prepared by paid preparers and 37% by taxpayers themselves. Author’s calculations, based
on id.
14. Rev. Rul. 72-100, 1972-1 C.B. 122, 1972 WL 30448 (permitting the use of the
Rule of 78's to calculate interest with respect to installment notes with terms of sixty months
or less).
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mass-market handheld financial calculator. 15 The following year the IRS
issued a revenue ruling stating that the Rule of 78's “lacks economic
substance because it fails to reflect the true cost of borrowing,” and
concluding that the Rule could no longer be used to calculate interest for
purposes of the federal income tax. 16 The ruling did not mention the advent
of the HP 12C, but it is unlikely that the appearance of the ruling shortly
after the appearance of the calculator was a coincidence. Perhaps
something similar might now happen in response to the near-ubiquity of tax
preparation software; perhaps some superior tax legislative policies
requiring complex tax return calculations can now be enacted.
It is easy enough to acknowledge the theoretical possibility that
such policies might exist. It is much more difficult to think of concrete
examples of such policies. Two possibilities come to mind, but both are far
from compelling. The first is the introduction of continuously variable
marginal tax rates. When optimal tax analysts investigate the attributes of
the tax-and-transfer systems that would maximize various social welfare
functions under various conditions, they generally find that the optimal
income tax features continuously varying marginal tax rates, so that each
dollar of a taxpayer’s income would be taxed at a different rate. 17 Prior to
the development and widespread use of return preparation software,
implementation of such a tax rate structure would have been impossible, no
matter how compelling the theoretical case in its favor. Today, software
could handle the computational complexity with ease.
Should Congress respond to the near-ubiquity of return preparation
software by enacting continuously varying marginal tax rates? Probably
not.
Optimal tax analysts generally find that the social welfare
improvements from continuously varying rates, in comparison with a
limited number of tax brackets—or, indeed, with a single (“flat”) rate—are
quite modest. 18 And these modest improvements do not take into account
15. Tim Carvell, The Product Hewlett-Packard Couldn’t (and Shouldn’t) Kill,
FORTUNE, Dec. 9, 1996, at 40.
16. Rev. Rul. 83-84, 1983-1 C.B. 97, 1983 WL 190117. The ruling was accompanied
by a narrow exception, permitting the continued use of the Rule of 78's in connection with
certain short-term consumer loans. Rev. Proc. 83-40, 1983-1 C.B. 774. 1983 WL 189227.
The exception survived for more than a decade, before it was finally “obsoleted”. Rev. Proc.
97-37, 1997-2 C.B. 455, 1997 WL 430911.
17. See, e.g., MATTI TUOMALA, OPTIMAL INCOME TAX AND REDISTRIBUTION 95–99
(1990) (presenting optimal marginal tax rate curves based on a variety of social welfare
functions and factual assumptions; in most simulations the marginal tax rate rises through
the bottom ten percent of the wage distribution, but declines thereafter).
18. The seminal work on optimal income tax analysis is James Mirrlees, An
Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 175 (1971).
As later scholars have noted, Mirrlees made the surprising “discovery . . . that, at least in the
cases he considered, the optimal non-linear tax structure was approximately linear!” Joel
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the negative effects of continuously varying rates, in terms of taxpayer
confusion and incomprehension, and in terms of frustration of tax planning
(which requires knowledge of one’s marginal tax rate or rates). Once the
negative effects were factored in, the detriments of continuously varying
rates would probably outweigh the benefits, even with return preparation
software doing all the computational heavy lifting. One prominent optimal
tax study, concerning the relative merits of a flat tax and a two-bracket
system concluded, “[T]he benefits of allowing two brackets rather than one
are very sensitive to the parameterization of the problem and may or may
not be sufficient to justify the additional administrative cost.” 19 If the
optimal tax benefits of something as simple as a two-bracket system may
not be worth the trouble caused by the introduction of the second bracket, it
is not likely that the optimal tax benefits of continuously varying rates
would be sufficient compensation for the inevitable incomprehension and
interference with tax planning. Many taxpayers would not understand
either the policy justification for or the mechanical operation of
continuously varying rates, and even taxpayers who did understand the rate
structure in theory would be unable to determine their effective marginal
tax rate(s) for planning purposes.
For another example of a tax policy, the realization of which might
be promoted by the spread of return preparation software, consider
proposals to eliminate income tax marriage penalties on two-earner couples
by allowing spouses to file separate returns (using the section 1(c) rates
applicable to single persons, rather than the unfavorable section 1(d) rates
currently applicable to married persons filing separate returns) if their
combined separate return liabilities are less than their joint return liability.
A bill permitting optional separate filing passed the Senate in 1999, but
never became law. 20 In an era of pencil-and-paper tax return preparation, it
would have been a serious objection to optional separate filing that it
requires a couple to prepare three tentative returns—one joint and two
separate—in order to determine whether joint filing or separate filing
produces the lower tax liability. With taxpayers in 1999 in the midst of the
transition from pencils to software, this objection still had some force. It
would, however, have almost no force today. If one believed in 1999 that
optional separate filing would be good tax policy, but for the need to
prepare three tentative returns, then in 2009 one should whole-heartedly
support optional separate filing. Preparing and comparing three tentative
returns is no challenge for software.
Slemrod, Shlomo Yitzhaki, Joram Mayshear, & Michael Lundholm, The Optimal TwoBracket Linear Income Tax, 53 J. PUB. ECON. 269, 270 (1994).
19. Slemrod et al., supra note 18, at 285.
20. Taxpayer Refund Act of 1999, S. 1429, 106th Cong., § 201.
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Unfortunately, the case for optional separate filing is weak, even in
2009. For one thing, optional separate filing not only introduces the
computational complexity of tentative returns, it also introduces the noncomputational complexity of allocating income, deduction, and credit items
between the spouses for purposes of the separate returns. Software offers
no assistance in dealing with complexity of this sort. More fundamentally,
there is a powerful argument that optional separate filing would be bad tax
policy on the merits, even if it created no complexity of any kind. The
objection is that optional separate filing is philosophically incoherent. 21
The standard policy justification for having joint returns at all—rather than
simply requiring all married persons to file separate returns under the same
rate structure applicable to unmarried persons—is that married couples
function as economic units, so that two married couples with the same
combined income should have the same tax liability regardless of the
division of the incomes between the spouses in each marriage. But
consider two equal-income couples under an optional separate filing
regime. In one marriage, all the income is earned by one spouse, while in
the other marriage half the income is earned by each spouse. The former
couple will file a joint return, while the latter couple will file two separate
returns and pay less tax. The purpose of a joint return system is to impose
equal tax on equal income couples, but optional separate filing fatally
undermines that purpose.
To sum up: In theory, the near-universal use of return preparation
software might facilitate the introduction of desirable tax rules previously
impeded by computational complexity. It is extremely difficult, however,
to identify even one compelling example of such a rule. It is much easier to
identify examples of the opposite phenomenon—bad tax policies the
introduction of which would have been impeded by computational
complexity in the pencil-and-paper era, but which survive and flourish in
the age of TurboTax. The next section of this Essay considers this
phenomenon.
III. THE ROLE OF SOFTWARE IN FACILITATING THE ENACTMENT OF BAD
TAX POLICIES
Under current law, the major sources of computational complexity
impacting large numbers of taxpayers are the alternative minimum tax
(AMT) and the phase-outs of various deductions, exclusions and credits for
21. For a fuller development of the argument against optional separate filing based on
philosophical incoherence, see Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage
Penalties: A Guide for the Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1, 17–19 (2000).
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taxpayers with incomes above the various phase out thresholds. As detailed
below, the impact of both the AMT and of phase-outs has increased
dramatically over the same period that software has supplanted the pencil as
the dominant return preparation tool. It would probably be impossible to
prove a direct causal connection between the ascendancy of software and
the increasing computational complexity of the average tax return. Indeed,
a major theme of this Essay is that increasing complexity does not
inevitably follow from the spread of software; Congress can and should
replace the computational complexity constraint on tax legislation with selfrestraint. Nevertheless, there is good reason to suspect that it is no accident
that the increase in tax return complexity has coincided with the triumph of
return preparation software. 22
This section begins by examining the AMT, and then turns to
phase-outs. It demonstrates how both the AMT and phase outs have
expanded as software usage has increased, and explains why both the
expanding reach of the AMT and the proliferation of phase outs are bad
policy, even if no one ever again prepares a tax return without computer
assistance.
A.

The Alternative Minimum Tax

The minimum tax was introduced in 1969, more than a decade
before the first computer-prepared tax return. 23 The purpose was to ensure
that taxpayers with high economic incomes could not avoid substantial tax
liabilities by aggressively exploiting exclusions, deductions, and credits. 24
Since 1978, the minimum tax has taken the form of an “alternative”
minimum tax. 25 Having computed her regular tax liability by applying the
regular tax rates to her regular taxable income, the taxpayer must calculate
her tentative minimum tax by applying the AMT tax rates to her AMT tax
base, which is defined as her alternative minimum taxable income
(“AMTI”) in excess of the AMT exemption amount. 26 The rules defining
22. It is not possible here to disprove alternative explanations for the increase in tax
return complexity. Perhaps, for example, Congress has recently become persuaded that the
pursuit of an equitable distribution of tax burdens requires an increase in computational
complexity, and Congress would have so decided even if tax return software had not been
available to handle the computations. Occam’s razor, however, strongly favors the
explanation suggested in the text—that the widespread availability of return preparation
software eliminated the complexity constraint and Congress responded by enacting widely
applicable tax laws of unprecedented computational complexity.
23. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §301, 83 Stat. 487, 580–81.
24. S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 518–19 (2d Sess. 1986).
25. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 421, 92 Stat. 2763, 2871–72.
26. I.R.C. § 55(b)(1) (2009).

100

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW

[Vol. 1:91

AMTI disallow a number of tax preferences (exclusions and deductions)
that are permitted for purposes of the regular tax. 27 If the tentative
minimum tax exceeds the taxpayer’s regular tax liability, she must pay that
excess as her AMT liability (in addition, of course, to paying the regular
tax). 28 AMT calculations greatly increase the difficulty of pencil-and-paper
tax return preparation, but if the taxpayer (or her paid preparer) uses
software the computational difficulties vanish.
In 1970 (the first year in which the minimum tax applied), only
20,000 taxpayers were subject to the minimum tax. 29 The number of
affected taxpayers generally increased in subsequent years—albeit with
large year-to-year fluctuations in both directions. 30 By far the greatest
increase in the number of taxpayers subject to the AMT, however, has
occurred in the past decade. The number of taxpayers subject to the AMT
more than tripled from 1.3 million in 2001 to 4.0 million in 2005. 31
The primary cause of this increase was the fact that the 2001 and
2003 reductions in the regular income tax 32 (some of which were phased in
over several years) were not accompanied by parallel reductions in the
AMT. 33 As taxpayers’ regular tax liabilities declined over the decade and
their tentative minimum taxes did not, many taxpayers’ tentative minimum
taxes exceeded their regular tax liabilities for the first time. In most cases,
these were not the truly wealthy taxpayers who were the original targets of
the minimum tax. In 2007, 3.6% of taxpayers with cash incomes in the
$100,000 to $200,000 range were subject to the AMT, as were 47.0% of
taxpayers with cash incomes in the $200,000 to $500,000 range, and 57.2%
of taxpayers with cash incomes ranging from $500,000 to $1,000,000. 34 By
contrast, only 37.3% of taxpayers with cash incomes above $1,000,000

27. I.R.C. § 55(b)(2) (2009).
28. I.R.C. § 55(a) (2009).
29. Greg Leiserson & Jeffrey Rohaly, The Individual Alternative Minimum Tax:
Historical Data and Projections, Updated June 2008, TAX POLICY CENTER 10, Tbl.2 (June
25, 2008), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?ID=411703
(last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
30. See id. tbl.2.
31. See id. tbl.2. In 2006 4.0 million taxpayers were again subject to the AMT, and in
2007 (the most recent year for which data are available) the tax applied to 4.1 million
taxpayers. Id.
32. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
115 Stat. 38 (2001); Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-27, 117 Stat. 752 (2003).
33. Gregg A. Esenwein, Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress: The
Alternative Minimum Tax for Individuals: Legislative Initiatives and Their Revenue Effects
(CRS/RS 22563) (updated May 22, 2007), at 1 (on file with Columbia Journal of Tax Law).
34. Leiserson & Rohaly, supra note 29, at 11 tbl.3.
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were subject to the AMT. 35
The two leading AMT preference items today are not the sort of
wealthy, investor tax preference items at which the AMT was originally
targeted. In 2006, state and local tax deductions constituted 70.57 percent
(by dollar amount) of all AMT preferences, and personal exemptions
constituted another 19.05 percent. 36 The AMT exemption amount is not
indexed for inflation (unlike the analogous provisions of the regular tax),
but Congress has been enacting annual AMT “patches” in lieu of a
permanent fix for this problem. 37 If Congress should ever fail to enact a
“patch,” the number of taxpayers affected by the AMT would increase
tremendously, to more than 30 million. 38
No one can state with certainty whether Congress would have been
willing to subject almost three million more taxpayers (the difference
between 1.3 million in 2001 and 4.1 million in 2007) to the AMT in this
decade, in a world of pencil-and-paper tax return preparation. It is
reasonable to surmise, however, that in that alternate universe, complaints
of computational complexity would have been a serious impediment to the
exclusion of the AMT from the tax reductions of 2001 and 2003. But with
more than four out of five returns for tax year 2001 prepared on
computers, 39 and with the expectation that the dominance of software
would only increase over time, Congress had no reason to fear major
taxpayer objections to the computational complexity of the expanding
AMT.
The question remains: if the computational complexity of the AMT
is no longer a problem in the TurboTax era, what is wrong with imposing
the AMT on millions—or even tens of millions—of taxpayers? When it
urged the repeal of the AMT in its 2005 Report, the President’s Advisory
Panel on Federal Tax Reform (“Panel”) condemned the AMT solely on the
basis of computational complexity: “Eliminating the AMT would free
millions of middle-class taxpayers . . . from filing the forms, preparing the
worksheets, and making the seemingly endless calculations required to
35. Id. at 11.
36. Tax Policy Center, AMT Preference Items, 2002, 2004–2006 1, available at
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayfact.cfm?Docid=468 (last visited Feb. 14,
2010).
37. See, e.g., American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 1115, §1012, 123 Stat. 115 (enacting the AMT “patch” for 2009).
38. Leiserson & Rohaly, supra note 29, at 11 tbl.3 (estimating that 34.8 million
taxpayers will be subject to the AMT in 2010 in the absence of a “patch” for that year).
39. According to the Internal Revenue Service, 80.16% of 2001 returns were prepared
on computers. Internal Revenue Service, Tax Year 2001 Taxpayer Usage Study, Report 14,
available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=184856,00.html (follow “2002” link
under “Archives”) (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
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determine their AMT liability.” 40 Somehow the Panel missed the fact that
very few taxpayers (or their paid preparers) actually wrestle with these
forms, worksheets, and calculations, because the vast majority of AMT
returns are now prepared on computers (and virtually all are likely to be
computer-prepared in the near future). If this is the only objection to a
burgeoning AMT, then there is really no meaningful objection.
Tax historian Joseph Thorndike shares the view of this Essay that,
as a political matter, computationally complex tax provisions of wide
applicability can survive and flourish in the TurboTax era, and he ruefully
predicts that the AMT—which he excoriates as “a bad tax, a blight on the
nation’s revenue structure”—will not “cause enough pain to ensure its own
demise.” 41 Like the Panel, however, Thorndike does not explain what is so
objectionable about the AMT, when millions of computers stand ready to
do all the number-crunching. Despite his lack of explanation, Thorndike is
right—the AMT is a bad tax, even with those millions of computers at the
ready.
The fundamental problem is that the AMT turns the tax system into
a black box for those taxpayers to whom it applies. TurboTax or a paid
preparer will tell the taxpayer his overall tax liability, but the taxpayer may
not focus on the portion of that liability attributable to the AMT. Even if
the taxpayer happens to notice the amount of his AMT, he will almost
certainly not understand the derivation of that figure. To that taxpayer, the
tax system is a black box, producing a tax liability through some
incomprehensible process. There are two serious objections to a black-box
tax system.
The first objection is grounded in civics. As Charles McLure has
noted, a black-box tax system is “hardly a recipe for good governance in a
democracy.” 42 If taxpayers do not have at least a rough idea of the process
through which their tax liabilities are determined, they can have no way of
evaluating the fairness of the tax system, as applied either to themselves or
to others. 43 Taxation without comprehension is as inimical to democracy as

40. President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair, and Pro-Growth:
Proposals to Fix America’s Tax System, 211 TAX NOTES TODAY 14 (Nov. 2, 2005).
41. Joseph J. Thorndike, The Great Noncrisis of the AMT, 107 TAX NOTES 245 (2005).
42. Charles E. McLure, Jr., Economics and Tax Reform: 1986 and Now, 113 TAX
NOTES 362 (2006).
43. The workings of the AMT are not completely opaque to a highly observant
TurboTax user. TurboTax features a small box near the top of the computer screen, which
keeps a running score of the taxpayer’s underpayment or overpayment on the assumption
that the taxpayer has already made all data entries. It can be a disturbing experience for a
TurboTax user subject to the AMT to enter a five-figure state and local tax deduction and
see the number in the small box change only a little or not at all.
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taxation without representation. 44
The second objection relates to the ability of taxpayers to engage in
well-informed basic tax planning, and to respond appropriately to the many
incentives Congress has embedded in the tax laws. If a taxpayer is unable
to determine whether he is subject to the AMT until after the end of the tax
year (that is, until after the return has been prepared), he will be unable to
determine whether his marginal tax rate is that of the regular tax or that of
the AMT. As a result, he will be unable to determine (for example) his
after-tax cost of charitable giving, or his after-tax return from earning extra
income. Worse yet, in the case of AMT preference items, the taxpayer will
be unable to determine whether the favorable regular tax treatment of those
items is available to him. A taxpayer may take out a second mortgage,
relying on the deductibility of interest on home equity indebtedness under
the regular tax, 45 only to be blindsided by the nondeductibility of such
interest under the AMT. 46 Or a taxpayer may buy a house in a highproperty-tax jurisdiction, relying on the income tax deductibility of the
property tax, 47 only to lose the deduction under the AMT. 48 Or consider a
taxpayer who bought a hybrid car before 2009, expecting to receive a
widely-advertised tax credit, only to discover too late that the credit was not
allowed for purposes of the AMT and that the AMT applied to the
taxpayer. 49
If AMT taxpayers are induced to engage in behavior which is taxfavored under the regular tax—either not realizing they are subject to the
AMT, or not realizing that the tax preference is not available under the
AMT—the result is manifestly unfair. The other possibility is just as
troubling—that taxpayers not subject to the AMT may fail to respond to
incentives in the regular income tax, based on an awareness that the
incentives do not apply under the AMT and a fear that they may be subject
to the AMT. As Austan Goolsbee has commented, a black box tax system

44. See Lawrence Zelenak, Justice Holmes, Ralph Kramden, and the Civic Virtues of a
Return Filing Requirement, 61 TAX L. REV. 53, 71–72 (2007) (arguing that the income tax
return filing requirement can have the “civic virtue” of making taxpayers conscious of the
distribution of the costs of government, but that that benefit is lost if taxpayers perceive the
income tax “as a black box, producing income tax liabilities through the use of
incomprehensible rules that taxpayers have no reason to assume are fair”).
45. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C) (2009).
46. I.R.C. § 56 (b)(1)(C)(i) (2009).
47. I.R.C. § 164(a)(2) (2009).
48. I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2009).
49. See Lawrence Zelenak, Of Prius Buyers, Blue States, Consumer Energy Credits,
and the Alternative Minimum Tax, 109 TAX NOTES 657 (Oct. 31, 2005). As recently
amended, §30B(g)(2) now provides that the hybrid vehicle credit may be claimed against the
AMT as well as the regular tax.
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wreaks havoc with tax incentives:
If people do not understand the incentives embodied in the
system, they will not respond to them. On the one hand,
this makes the system efficient and nondistortionary . . . .
On the other hand, the ability to influence behavior was
exactly the policymakers’ point in creating the complex tax
system to begin with. In the long run that purpose would
be lost. 50
Perhaps the costs of a black-box AMT of widespread applicability
would be worth bearing, if the AMT served a sufficiently important purpose
that could not be served in some simpler fashion. But applying the AMT to
millions of less-than-wealthy taxpayers, largely by reason of their living in
high-tax states or having children, does nothing to serve the original
purpose of the AMT (that is, to ensure that wealthy taxpayers could not
avoid substantial income tax liabilities by aggressively taking advantage of
various tax preferences). 51 And neither Congress nor commentators have
suggested any new policy rationale for the tax as it currently exists—other
than mere revenue raising, which could be pursued more simply and more
rationally in any number of other ways.
B.

Phase-outs

The use of phase-outs in the income tax dates back at least to the
1954 Code. 52 Section 214 of the 1954 Code allowed a deduction for up to

50. Austan Goolsbee, The TurboTax Revolution: Can Technology Solve Tax
Complexity?, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 124, 138 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel
Slemrod eds., 2004).
51. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
52. Provisions which allow deductions only to the extent expenditures exceed some
specified percentage of adjusted gross income (AGI), and provisions which phase-in benefits
as income increases, both resemble phase-outs in terms of computational complexity,
taxpayer confusion, and the production of effective marginal tax rates different from
statutory marginal tax rates under I.R.C. §1. Because of these similarities, analysts
frequently discuss percentage-of-AGI floors and phase-ins along with phase-outs. See, e.g.,
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS
RELATING TO INDIVIDUAL EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES JCS-3-98 (1998). Floors and
phase-ins are not considered here, however, because—in sharp contrast with phase-outs—
they have not proliferated as the use of return preparation software has expanded in recent
decades. The three significant percentage-of-AGI floors in the individual income tax are the
7.5% floor applicable to medical expenses (Internal Revenue Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83591, §213(a), 68A Stat. 3, 69 (imposing a 3%-of-AGI floor; under current I.R.C. §213(a) the
floor is 7.5%)), the 10% floor on personal casualty losses (Tax Equity and Fiscal
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$600 of dependent care expenses, but reduced the otherwise allowable
deduction (in the case of taxpayers filing a joint return) by the amount by
which adjusted gross income (AGI) exceeded $4,500. 53 A second phaseout was added to the income tax with the introduction of the earned income
tax credit (EITC) in 1975. 54 A qualifying taxpayer with exactly $4,000 of
earned income was entitled to a $400 credit. The credit was reduced,
however, by 10 percent of the amount by which the taxpayer’s income
exceeded $4,000 (with the phase-out thus completed at $8,000).
Phase-outs remained rare in the income tax until the 1980s.
Legislation enacted in 1983 phased out half of the exclusion of Social
Security benefits from gross income, pursuant to a complex formula. 55 The
Tax Reform Act of 1986 added a provision designed to phase out the
benefit of personal exemptions and the benefit of the 15 percent tax bracket
(as compared to the 28 percent tax bracket). 56 The provision imposed a
special tax equal to five percent of the excess of the taxpayer’s taxable
income over a specified phase-out threshold (based on filing status), with
the maximum special tax liability limited to the tax reduction attributable to
personal exemptions and the 15 percent bracket. 57 For taxpayers in the
Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §203(a), 96 Stat. 324, 422 (now codified at
I.R.C. §165(h)(2))), and the 2% floor applicable to miscellaneous itemized deductions (Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §132, 100 Stat. 2085, 2113-16 (now codified at
I.R.C. §67)). The two significant phase-ins are the phase-in of the earned income tax credit
(Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, §204, 89 Stat. 26, 30-32 (now codified at
I.R.C. §32(b))), and the phase-in of the refundability of the child tax credit (Economic
Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §201(c), 115 Stat. 38, 46
(now codified at I.R.C. §24(d))).
As explained later in this Essay (see supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text), in recent
years Congress has used phase-outs for two purposes: to impose hidden marginal tax rate
increases on all or nearly all taxpayers in particular income ranges, and to target new tax
benefits to lower- and middle-income taxpayers. Because neither percentage-of-AGI floors
nor phase-ins are well suited to either of these purposes, the removal of the complexity
constraint has not prompted a flurry of floor and phase-in legislation.
53. Internal Revenue Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, §214, 68A Stat. 3, 70-71.
54. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, §204, 89 Stat. 26, 30-32 (now
codified at I.R.C. §32). The 1975 version of the EITC was a temporary provision, but
Congress made the credit permanent in 1978. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600,
§103, 92 Stat. 2761, 2771.
55. The formula reduced the exclusion by the amount by which the sum of the
taxpayer’s modified adjusted gross income and half of the taxpayer’s Social Security
benefits exceeded a “base amount” ($25,000 for unmarried taxpayers, and $32,000 for
taxpayers filing joint returns). Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21,
§121, 97 Stat. 65, 80-82 (now codified at I.R.C. §86(c)).
56. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §101(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2097-98
(formerly codified at I.R.C. §1(g)).
57. The 1986 Act also introduced an analogous phase-out of the AMT exemption
amount. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §701(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2320-22
(now codified at I.R.C. §55(d)(3)).
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phase-out range the official marginal tax rate was 28 percent, but the
effective marginal tax rate—considering both the official rate and the
phase-out—was 33 percent. Once the phase-out was completed (that is,
once the benefits of the personal exemptions and the 15 percent bracket had
been fully taxed away), the effective marginal tax rate dropped to 28
percent. As is typically the case with phase-outs, the result was an effective
marginal tax rate “bubble”, with taxpayers in the phase-out range subject to
higher effective marginal tax rates than taxpayers at both lower and higher
income levels. The 1986 Act also introduced an income-based phase-out of
the ability to make deductible individual retirement account (IRA)
contributions, applicable to active participants in tax-favored employmentbased retirement plans. 58
Phase-outs became a significant feature of the income tax in the
1980s, but the most dramatic growth in phase-outs occurred in the
following decade. In 1990 Congress repealed the five percent phase-out tax
of the 1986 Act, 59 only to replace it with two new phase-outs. One of the
new phase-outs reduced otherwise allowable itemized deductions by the
lesser of (1) three percent of the excess of AGI over $100,000, or (2) 80
percent of otherwise allowable itemized deductions. 60 The other phase-out
reduced the dollar amount of otherwise allowable personal exemptions by
two percentage points for each $2,500 by which the taxpayer’s AGI
exceeded a specified threshold amount (based on filing status). 61 In 1993
Congress revisited the exclusion of Social Security benefits, providing for
the phase-out of 85 percent of the exclusion for some taxpayers. 62 The
banner year for phase-outs was 1997, in which Congress introduced the
child tax credit, 63 the Hope scholarship and lifetime learning credits, 64 the
deduction for interest on student loans, 65 Roth IRAs, 66 and educational

58. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §1101(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2411-14
(now codified at I.R.C. §219(g)).
59. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §11101(b), 104
Stat. 1388, 1388-404.
60. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11103(a), 104
Stat. 1388, 1388-406 (now codified at I.R.C. § 68).
61. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11104(a), 104
Stat. 1388, 1388-407 (now codified at I.R.C. § 151(d)(3)).
62. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13215, 107
Stat. 312, 475-76 (now codified at I.R.C. § 86(a)(2)).
63. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 101(a), 111 Stat. 788, 796-98
(now codified at I.R.C. § 24).
64. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 201(a), 111 Stat. 788, 799-803
(now codified at I.R.C. § 25A).
65. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 202(a), 111 Stat. 788, 806-08
(now codified at I.R.C. § 221).
66. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 302(a), 111 Stat. 788, 825-28

2010]

COMPLEX TAX LEGISLATION IN THE TURBOTAX ERA

107

savings accounts 67 —each with its own phase-out provision, reducing or
eliminating the ability of higher-income taxpayers to claim the tax benefit.
In 1998, in response to the proliferation of phase-outs, the Staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation published a lengthy report describing and
evaluating income tax provisions “that can result in a taxpayer’s effective
marginal tax rate deviating from the statutory marginal tax rate.” 68 The
Staff identified eighteen such phase-out provisions. 69 Some of the
provisions were highly specialized and affected few taxpayers, but others
were of widespread applicability. The Staff reported the number of
taxpayers whose marginal tax rates were affected by the various phase-out
provisions: 11.7 million by the phase-out of the EITC, 5.0 million by the
partial phase-out of the exclusion of Social Security benefits, 4.5 million by
the limitation on itemized deductions, 1.6 million by the partial phase-out
of the dependent care credit, 1.5 million by the phase-out of eligibility to
make deductible IRA contributions, 1.4 million by the phase-out of
personal exemptions, and 1.2 million by the phase-out of the Hope
scholarship and lifetime learning credits (combined). 70 Because of its focus
on effective marginal tax rates, the Staff provided no estimates of the
numbers of taxpayers with incomes above the various phase-out ranges,
whose tax liabilities were increased by the phase-outs but whose effective
marginal tax rates were not.
The pace of phase-out legislation slowed after 1997, and in 2001
Congress even made a show of repealing two prominent phase-outs—the
limitation on itemized deductions and the phase-out of personal
exemptions. 71 However, in the spirit of St. Augustine praying for
chastity— “Give me chastity and self-control, but not just yet” 72 —
Congress delayed the repeals for many years. The repeals had no effect
until 2006. In 2006 and 2007 they reduced the otherwise applicable phaseout amounts by one-third, and in 2008 and 2009 by two-thirds. The repeal
is fully effective in 2010—but only in 2010, because the repeals (in

(now codified at I.R.C. § 408A).
67. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 213(a), 111 Stat. 788, 813-16
(now codified at I.R.C. § 24).
68. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 52.
69. Id. at 4-9 chart 1. Altogether, the Staff identified twenty-two provisions that could
cause effective marginal tax rates to differ from statutory rates. The non-phase out
provisions were a small number of percentage-of-AGI floors on deductions and phase-ins of
tax benefits. Floors and phase-ins are discussed earlier. See supra note 52.
70. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 52, at 4–7 chart 1.
71. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§ 102, 115 Stat. 38, 44 (relating to the phase-out of personal exemptions), § 103, 151 Stat.
38, 44-45 (relating to the limitation on itemized deductions).
72. ST. AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS 173 (Garry Wills trans., 2006).

108

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW

[Vol. 1:91

common with all the 2001 tax reductions) are scheduled to “sunset” at the
end of this year. 73 Congress continues to enact new phase-outs from time
to time, although not at the pace of the 1990s. For example, the first-time
homebuyer credit enacted in 2008 is subject to an income-based phaseout, 74 as was the one-time “recovery rebate” created by 2008 legislation. 75
In addition to enacting new phase-outs, Congress has designed some phaseout provisions so that their impact increases over time without the need for
additional legislation. These are the phase-out provisions with AGI
thresholds that are not indexed for inflation; the most important example is
the phase-out of the child tax credit, the phase-out thresholds of which have
remain unchanged ($110,000 for taxpayers filing joint returns, and $75,000
for unmarried taxpayers) since enactment. 76 In 1998 only 0.6 million
taxpayers had effective marginal tax rates affected by the phase-out of the
child tax credit. 77 Comparable data are not available for recent years, but
with the thresholds badly eroded by inflation it is probable that several
times that many taxpayers are affected today. 78
Data on the numbers of taxpayers affected by the various phaseouts is much harder to come by than data on the number of taxpayers
affected by the AMT. Although the 1998 report of the Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation included a comprehensive analysis of the numbers
of taxpayers with effective marginal tax rates affected by the various
provisions as of 1998, 79 nothing comparable is available for more recent
years. It is clear, however, that in the aggregate, phase-outs impact a
tremendous number of taxpayers. According to the National Taxpayer
Advocate (NTA), more than 60 million returns of individuals for tax year
2004 were “affected by one or more phaseouts,” as were more than 70
million returns for tax year 2006. 80 The total number of individual returns

73. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§ 901, 115 Stat. 38, 150.
74. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 3011(a),
2888-91 (codified at I.R.C. § 36).
75. Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-185, § 101(a), 122 Stat. 613,
613-15 (codified at I.R.C. § 6428).
76. I.R.C. § 24(b) (2009).
77. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 52, at 6 chart 1.
78. If the thresholds had been adjusted for inflation since 1998, the $75,000 threshold
would now be approximately $98,000, and the $110,000 threshold would now be
approximately $144,000. Bureau of Labor Statistics Inflation Calculator, available at
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
79. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 52, at 4–9 chart 1.
80. National Taxpayer Advocate, 2006 Annual Report to Congress 470 (2006);
National Taxpayer Advocate, 2008 Annual Report to Congress 410 (2008). There is an
important ambiguity in the NTA’s statistics. It is unclear whether the numbers reflect only
those taxpayers with effective marginal tax rates affected by phase-outs (as in the case of
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for tax year 2006 was 138.4 million, 81 so according to the NTA most
returns were affected by phase-outs. Because there is considerable overlap
in the income ranges over which the various phase-outs operate, 82 many
taxpayers have effective marginal tax rates influenced by more than one
phase-out.
From the history recounted above, it is apparent that the complexity
constraint did not prevent the enactment of some phase-outs during the
pencil-and-paper era of tax return preparation. The 1954 enactment of the
phase-out of the dependent care credit and the 1975 enactment of the phaseout of the EITC predate even the earliest use of return preparation software,
and the phase-outs of the 1986 Act were introduced when only about one
return in eight was prepared on a computer. 83 It is impossible to say
whether taxpayers and their paid preparers would have tolerated the
profusion of widely applicable phase-outs in the current income tax—and
especially the simultaneous applicability of several phase-outs to the same
taxpayer—if return preparation software had never been developed. It
seems unlikely, however, that it is merely a coincidence that by the time of
the phase-out-strewn Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, 67 percent of all

STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 52, at 4–9 chart 1), or whether the
numbers also include taxpayers with incomes above the phase-out ranges of the various
credits. If the NTA’s numbers reflect only those taxpayers with phase-out-affected marginal
tax rates, then the total number of taxpayers affected by phase-outs must be even higher than
the numbers reported by the NTA.
81. I.R.S. Individual Income Tax Returns 2006, Publication 1304 (Rev. 07-2008), at 2
tbl.A.
82. Consider, for example, the following 2009 phase-out ranges applicable to taxpayers
filing joint returns. For 2009 (or any other year, given the absence of an inflation
adjustment), the phase-down range for the dependent care credit was $15,000 to $43,001.
I.R.C. § 21(a)(2) (2009). For the phase-out of the child tax credit (which also lacks an
inflation adjustment), the phase-out range was $110,000 to 129,001 for taxpayers with one
qualifying child, $110,000 to $149,001 for taxpayers with two qualifying children,
$110,000 to $169,001 for taxpayers with three qualifying children, and so on. I.R.C. § 24(b)
(2009). For the EITC, the 2009 phase-out range for a couple with two qualifying children
was $21,420 to $45,295. REV. PROC. 2009-21, § 4.06, 2009 IRB Lexis 147. The 2009
phase-out range for the Hope scholarship credit was $160,000 to $180,000. I.R.C. §
25A(i)(4) (2009). The 2009 phase-out threshold for the limitation on itemized deductions
was $166,800. REV. PROC. 2008-66, § 3.11, 2008-2 C.B. 1107. (Because of the unusual
design of this phase-out, there is no generally applicable higher end of the phase-out range.)
The 2009 phase-out range for personal exemptions was $250,000 to $372,700. REV. PROC.
2008-66, § 3.19(2), 2008-2 C.B. 1107. The 2009 phase-out range for eligibility to make
deductible IRA contributions (for active participants in employment-based retirement plans)
was $89,000 to $109,000. Notice 2008-102, 2008-2 C.B. 1106. The 2009 phase-out range
for the deductibility of interest on student loans was $120,000 to $150,000. REV. PROC.
2008-66, § 3.23, 2008-2 C.B. 1107. For eligibility to make contributions to Roth IRAs, the
2009 phase-out range was $166,000 to $188,000. Notice 2008-102, 2008-2 C.B. 1106.
83. Toder, supra note 4, at 759.
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individual returns were prepared on computers. 84
The growing use of return preparation software does not lead
inexorably to the proliferation of phase-outs. Congress might choose to
resist the phase-out impulse despite the removal of the complexity
constraint. The 2001 semi-repeal of the limitation on itemized deductions
and of the phase-out of personal exemptions—fully effective only for the
single year of 2010 85 —provides evidence of at least a limited legislative
ability to resist. In deciding whether to resist, Congress should ask with
respect to phase-outs the same sort of questions it should ask with respect to
the AMT. In a world in which tax return computational complexity is no
longer an issue, is it nevertheless important to repeal many, most, or all
phase-outs? What, if anything, is objectionable about phase-outs if
computers are able and willing to do all the number crunching? The
answers are basically the same as the answers to the parallel questions
concerning the AMT. Like the AMT, phase-outs turn the income tax into a
black box, imperiling both the political legitimacy of the income tax and the
ability of taxpayers to engage in informed tax planning. If phase-outs make
it difficult or impossible for taxpayers to understand the process by which
their tax liabilities are determined (especially when phase-out confusion
interacts with AMT confusion), taxpayers can have no confidence that their
own tax liabilities and the tax liabilities of their fellow citizens are being
determined by fair rules. And if taxpayers do not understand the phase-out
rules—both the rules in the abstract, and how the rules apply in their
particular circumstances—their tax planning ability is severely
compromised.
The tax planning problem can take two different forms. A standard
critique of phase-outs is that they impose hidden marginal tax rate
increases, thereby leading taxpayers to overestimate their after-tax returns
to additional labor effort. 86 Spouses in the phase-out range of the child tax
credit, for example, may know their official marginal tax rate (under I.R.C.
§ 1) is 25 percent, and so may assume that their after-federal-income-tax
income from earning an additional $1,000 will be $750—not realizing that
the phase-out of the child tax credit increases their effective marginal tax
rate to 30 percent and decreases the after-tax benefit of the additional
$1,000 to $700. This critique takes as a given the existence of the creditgenerating activity (in this case, having a “qualifying child” for purposes of
84. Data Release, supra note 8, at 131.
85. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 52, at 99; RICHARD
SCHMALBECK & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 39 (2d ed. 2007); Robert
J. Peroni, Reform in the Use of Phase-Outs and Floors in the Individual Income Tax System,
91 TAX NOTES 1415, 1431 (2001).
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the child tax credit), and treats the production of the additional income as
the marginal activity affected by the phase-out.
Although the fact is much less commonly noted, the planning
effects of a phase-out are quite different—but no less objectionable—if the
amount of the taxpayer’s pre-tax income is taken as the given and the
existence (or dollar amount) of the credit-generating activity is treated as
the tax-influenced decision. Suppose, for example, spouses are trying to
determine whether they can afford to send their child to a private college.
They rely on the existence of the Hope scholarship credit in their analysis,
only to discover—too late to be used in their decision-making process—that
they are entitled to a diminished credit, or no credit at all, because of the
phase-out. In this case, the unfairness of the phase-out provision relates not
to a disguised marginal tax rate increase, but to an illusory tax incentive.
If phase-outs further sufficiently important tax policy goals, they
might constitute good tax policy on balance, despite their unfortunate black
box effects. In that case, the removal of the complexity constraint by the
growth in computer-assisted tax return preparation would be a
commendable development. In fact, however, the policy arguments in
favor of phase-outs are weak.
In analyzing the policy merits of phase-outs, the first step is to
distinguish between two different legislative motivations for the enactment
of different phase-out provisions. One group of phase-outs is characterized
by a cynical legislative purpose—to impose hidden tax rate increases on
large numbers of taxpayers with incomes at or above the phase-out ranges,
without encountering the political opposition that would arise in response to
a straightforward increase in tax rates. The second group consists of phaseouts that are motivated by sincere (albeit generally misguided) legislative
concerns about limiting the cost to the fisc of tax expenditure programs and
about targeting those programs to income groups where the need is greatest.
Only two phase-outs belong unambiguously in the first group—the
limitation on itemized deductions and the phase-out of personal
exemptions. There are two defining features of phase-outs in this category;
both features must exist for a phase-out clearly to fit the category. First, a
phase-out of this sort applies to tax benefits that are so widely available (but
for the phase-out) that the effect of the phase-out closely approximates an
increase in the tax rates applicable to all taxpayers with incomes in or above
the phase-out range. This is true of both the limitation on itemized
deductions 87 and the phase-out of personal exemptions. 88 It is not true of
87. The vast majority of taxpayers with incomes at or above the phase-out range
itemize deductions, and even more would do so but for the limitation on itemized
deductions. See generally Reed Shuldiner & David Shakow, Lessons from the Limitation on
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most other phase-out provisions. For example, in any given year most
taxpayers do not incur child care expenses, incur higher education
expenses, buy a home for the first time, pay interest on student loans, or
contribute to IRAs. The second defining feature of a cynically-inspired
phase-out is that the existence of the tax benefit subject to the phase-out
predated the enactment of the phase-out—thus demonstrating that Congress
did not originally consider the phase-out an intrinsic part of the design of
the tax benefit. Itemized deductions existed for decades before the
enactment of the limitation on itemized deductions, and personal
exemptions were in the income tax long before the introduction of their
phase-out. By contrast, most other phase-outs—including those of the child
tax credit, the Hope scholarship and lifetime learning credits, the EITC, the
first-time homebuyer’s credit, the deduction for interest on student loans,
and eligibility to contribute to Roth IRAs—were part of the original
enactments of the tax benefits to which they relate. 89
There is nothing to be said in defense of type-one (cynical) phaseout provisions. They produce complexity and confusion, and they are
motivated by a congressional intent to deceive. If one takes seriously the
2001 semi-repeal of these provisions 90 —delayed, phased in, and
temporary—it seems that not even Congress itself approves of these phaseouts. According to the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, the 2001
Congress believed that both the limitation on itemized deductions and the
phase-out of personal exemptions were “unnecessarily complex way[s] to
impose taxes and that the ‘hidden’ way in which [both provisions] raise[]
marginal tax rates undermines respect for the tax laws.” 91 The bottom line
on type-one phase-outs is clear. They are an unmitigated tax policy
disaster, with no place in a well-designed tax system. As a political matter,
however, they may be able to survive in an environment in which software
has eliminated the computational complexity constraint.
The legislative motivation for type-two phase-outs is very different.
When Congress enacted the original EITC in 1975, the inclusion of a
phase-out was undoubtedly driven by a sincere desire to limit the EITC’s
wage subsidy to those families most in need of assistance, and to control the

Itemized Deductions, 93 TAX NOTES 673 (2001) (detailed empirical analysis of taxpayers
subject to the limitation on itemized deductions).
88. Any taxpayer subject to the exemption would be able to claim at least one personal
exemption—for herself or himself—but for the phase-out.
89. For the histories of these and other phase-out provisions, see supra notes 52–78
and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
91. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, General Explanation of Tax Legislation
Enacted in the 107th Cong., 13-14 (JCS-1-03) (2003).
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overall cost of the EITC program. 92 Similar concerns about targeting and
controlling program costs explain the inclusion of phase-outs in the original
enactments of many other tax benefits, including the child tax credit, the
Hope scholarship and lifetime learning credits, the student loan interest
deduction, the first-time homebuyer’s credit, and the recent recovery
rebates.
Recognizing the much more commendable motivation underlying
type-two phase-outs, commentators who call for immediate repeal of typeone phase-outs are generally more accepting of type-two phase-outs.
Robert J. Peroni, for example, flatly states that the limitation on itemized
deductions and the phase-out of personal exemptions “should both be
repealed as should all other phase-out provisions that are designed to
increase the progressivity of the tax system.” 93 In sharp contrast, he
concludes that type-two phase-outs have a legitimate place in the income
tax: “The most appropriate use of phase-out . . . provisions is as a means of
targeting the tax provision in question to reach a group of taxpayers in a
specified income range.” 94
In fact, however, the substantive case against type-two phase-outs
closely resembles the substantive case against type-one phase-outs. Despite
legislative good intentions, a type-two phase-out produces the same
deleterious black box impacts as a cynically motivated type-one phase-out.
But does not a type-two phase-out, unlike a type-one phase-out, serve
legitimate targeting and cost control purposes? It does not, at least on the
assumption that Congress has the option to modify the official tax rate
schedule (under I.R.C. § 1) in lieu of phasing out a newly-enacted tax
benefit.
To illustrate, suppose the adoption credit of current law 95 did not
exist, and that Congress is contemplating the creation of an adoption credit.
Congress is willing to accept only some specified level of revenue cost with
respect to the credit. Instead of controlling the cost by enacting the credit
with a phase-out, Congress could enact the credit without a phase-out and
simultaneously increase marginal tax rates under I.R.C. § 1 (presumably
focusing on the marginal rates applicable to higher-income taxpayers) so
that the net revenue cost of the credit and the increase in the official tax rate
schedule equals the revenue cost Congress would have been willing to
92. The committee reports emphasized the congressional desire to target the credit at
low-income wage earners. S. REP. NO. 94-36, at 33 (1975), reprinted in 1975-1 C.B. 590,
595; H.R. REP. NO. 94-19, at 10, reprinted in 1975-1 C.B. 569, 573–74.
93. Peroni, supra note 86, at 1433.
94. Id. at 1434.
95. I.R.C. § 23 (2009). The credit is phased out for higher-income taxpayers. I.R.C. §
23(b)(2) (2009).
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accept in the case of a phased-out credit. This approach avoids the black
box problems inherent in phase-outs, 96 and does so at no greater net
revenue cost than the alternative phased-out version of the credit. Under
this approach the adoption credit would be available to high income
taxpayers, but it is not apparent why that should be objectionable as long as
the accompanying adjustments to the official tax rate schedule impose an
appropriate tax burden on high income taxpayers as a group (taking into
account that some high income taxpayers will benefit from the new credit).
If one takes the reasonable position that, ceteris paribus, a high income
taxpayer with adoption expenses should have a modestly lower tax liability
than a high income taxpayer without such expenses, the availability of the
credit to high income taxpayers is not merely unobjectionable; it is
desirable. In short, a credit without a phase-out, but accompanied by an
appropriate adjustment in the official tax rate schedule, has several virtues
and no vices. It avoids all the evils of phase-outs, limits the net revenue
loss to the desired amount, does not produce vertical inequity, and
distinguishes appropriately at all income levels between taxpayers with and
without adoption expenses. 97 A phase out would be necessary only if, for
some strange reason, it was considered appropriate to distinguish between
taxpayers with and without adoption expenses at moderate income levels
but not appropriate to distinguish between taxpayers with and without
adoption expenses at high income levels. Replace adoption expenses with
any other category of expenditures currently eligible for a phased-out
deduction or credit, and the above analysis indicates that phase-outs of
those other deductions and credits are also not needed to control costs or
target benefits.
There are, however, two qualifications to the above analysis. First,
the analysis assumes Congress is able to revise the official tax rate schedule
as readily as it can enact a phase-out. If rate schedule adjustments are
politically constrained while phase-out enactments are not, it is possible
that the enactment of a phased-out tax benefit may constitute better policy

96. Assuming the amended tax rate schedule of I.R.C. § 1 follows the standard
approach of marginal tax rates increasing with income, this approach also avoids the
effective marginal tax rate “bubbles” typically caused by phase-outs.
97. Daniel Shaviro has made this point particularly clearly and forcefully. Phase-outs,
he explains, “reflect[] a fundamental misunderstanding—widely shared in the academic
literature—of basic design principles. . . . [P]haseouts raise questions of overall tax and
transfer allocations between households—not of program cost or benefit targeting.
Eliminating the phaseout on a revenue-neutral basis would simply mean that some
taxpayers’ marginal tax rates would drop while others’ would increase, permitting
implementation of a rate structure that might make more sense overall.” Daniel Shaviro, The
Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. CHI. L.
REV. 405, 408–09 (1997).
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than the only politically viable alternatives (that is, not enacting the tax
benefit in any form, or enacting the tax benefit without either a phase-out or
an adjustment to the official tax rate schedule).
Second, in the case of the phase-out of a provision of wide
applicability, such as the EITC, it is conceivable that the effective marginal
tax rates produced by the combination of the official tax rate schedule and
the phase-out might happen to be appropriate on the merits. Although
Congress has never shown any interest in enacting an official tax rate
structure featuring a marginal tax rate “bubble” akin to that produced by the
combination of the official rate structure and the EITC phase-out—with
taxpayers in the phase-out range subject to higher effective marginal tax
rates than taxpayers above the phase-out range—optimal tax analysis may
provide some support for that sort of effective marginal tax rate structure.
Simulations designed to determine the marginal tax rate structure that
maximizes a chosen social welfare function 98 commonly produce rising
marginal tax rates at low income levels and declining marginal tax rates at
moderate and high income levels. 99 Of course, it would be the sheerest
accident if the effective marginal tax rates produced by a conceptual error
(that is, the belief that the EITC must be phased out to target benefits or
control costs) happened to be close to the optimal rate structure produced
by a completely different analysis.
The bottom line on type-two phase-outs is that, although the
congressional motivations for their enactment are benign, on the merits they
are generally just as objectionable as the cynically-motivated type-one
phase outs. To the extent that computational complexity served as an
impediment to the enactment of type-two phase-outs in the era of penciland-paper tax return preparation, the complexity constraint had a favorable
tax policy impact. With the elimination of that constraint in the age of
TurboTax, some replacement for the constraint must be found to control
(or, better yet, to reverse) the proliferation of type-two phase-outs.

98. The social welfare function may be utilitarian (with the well-being of the lessadvantaged members of society given no special weight), or a Rawlsian-style maximin
(aimed at maximizing the well-being of the least-advantaged members of society), or
anything in between. Lawrence Zelenak & Kemper Moreland, Can the Graduated Income
Tax Survive Optimal Tax Analysis?, 53 TAX L. REV. 51, 52–53 (1999).
99. See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 15758 (Princeton University Press 2008); TUOMALA, supra note 17, at 95–99; Daniel N.
Shaviro, Welfare, Cash Grants, and Marginal Rates, 59 SMU L. REV. 835, 850 (2006). The
intuition behind these results is that high marginal rates at lower income levels raise tax
revenue available for social welfare-enhancing redistribution from higher income taxpayers
for whom those rates are not marginal, and that the efficiency cost of high marginal rates at
low income levels is modest because those rates are inframarginal for most of the taxpayers
to whom they apply. Zelenak & Moreland, supra note 98, at 54–55.
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Developing a satisfactory replacement for the complexity constraint may be
even more difficult in this context than in the contexts of the AMT and
type-one phase-outs. In the cases of the AMT and type-one phase-outs,
Congress is well aware that the provisions are bad policy, and all that is
needed to replace the complexity constraint is the development of a
legislative backbone. Even that may be easier said than done, but it is a less
daunting task than in the case of type-two phase-outs. Congress must first
be persuaded that type-two phase-outs constitute bad tax policy, before it
can be expected to develop the spine necessary to reject them.
IV. IS THERE A STRUCTURAL SOLUTION?
It would be nice, at this point in the Essay, to propose a structural
reform in the tax legislative process as a replacement for the complexity
constraint formerly imposed by the burden of tax return calculations. The
proposal might call for mandatory complexity analyses of proposed tax
legislation, for the purpose of heightening legislative awareness of
complexity concerns and encouraging Congress to look with skepticism
upon proposals with high complexity costs. As it happens, however,
Congress enacted this structural reform more than a decade ago, and it
appears to have done little or no good. Section 4022(a) of the Internal
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 requires the IRS
Commissioner to furnish Congress annually with “an analysis of the
sources of complexity in the administration of the Federal tax laws,”
including recommendations for reducing complexity. 100 Section 4022(b) of
the 1998 Act requires the Joint Committee on Taxation to provide Congress
with a “tax complexity analysis” of proposed tax legislation reported by the
House Ways and Means Committee, the Senate Finance Committee, or a
conference committee, if the proposed legislation includes any provision
“which has widespread applicability to individuals or small businesses.” 101
It will not surprise anyone familiar with the explosive growth of tax
expenditures in the years following the institutionalization of tax
expenditure budget analysis 102 that the structural reforms of 1998 have done
little or nothing to bring tax complexity under control. The IRS issued its
100. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105206, § 4022(a), 112 Stat. 685, 785.
101. Id. at 785–86.
102. For a history and critical analysis of the tax expenditure budget concept, see STAFF
OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS
(Comm. Print 2008). For the current tax expenditure budget, see STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009–2013
(Comm. Print 2010).
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first section 4022(a) report in 2000, highlighting the AMT as one of just
three sources of complexity discussed in the report. 103 A year later,
Congress responded by enacting massive reductions in the regular income
tax without corresponding reductions in the AMT, thereby greatly
increasing the number of taxpayers who would be subject to the AMT in
later years. 104 The Joint Committee on Taxation did its job under section
4022(b) with respect to the 2001 legislation. It alerted Congress that by
2010 an estimated “18 million additional individual income tax returns . . .
would be affected by the alternative minimum tax” as a result of the
proposed 2001 regular tax reductions, 105 but this did not dissuade Congress
from enacting the proposed regular tax reductions. Congress seemed to be
mocking the very complexity analyses it had mandated only three years
earlier.
The story is not quite so grimly amusing in the case of phase-outs.
As noted earlier, 106 the banner year for the enactment of phase-outs was
1997—a fact that might suggest that the tax complexity analyses required
by the 1998 legislation restrained the growth of phase-outs in later years.
This seems unlikely, however. For this interpretation to be persuasive,
there would have to be some explanation as to why Section 4022 was
effective in restraining the growth of phase-outs even as it was dramatically
ineffective in restraining the growth of the AMT. No such explanation
comes to mind. Moreover, as recounted earlier, Congress has continued to
enact new phase-outs in recent years (albeit not at the record-setting pace of
2007), 107 and has shown little interest in simplifying the law by repealing
existing phase-outs. 108
The problem is that the structural reforms of 1998 cannot force
Congress to be serious about resisting tax complexity. This is illustrated by
the fact that Congress does not even take the trouble to ensure that it
receives the input called for by the 1998 legislation.
The IRS
Commissioner has never filed another complexity report after the “first
annual” report of 2000, and there is no indication in the public record that

103. Internal Revenue Service, Annual Report from the Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue Service on Tax Law Complexity, 128-40 TAX NOTES TODAY (2000). The other
sources of complexity discussed in the report were estimated taxes and filing status
determinations.
104. For a description and discussion of the effect of the 2001 legislation on the growth
of the AMT, see supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
105. H.R. REP. NO. 107-84, at 329 (2001) (Conf. Rep.).
106. See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
108. As noted earlier (see supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text), the phase-outs of
§§ 68 and 151(d)(3) are scheduled to be eliminated only for the single year of 2010.
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anyone in Congress has complained. 109 The Joint Committee on Taxation
does provide complexity analyses of proposed legislation from time to time,
but it is quite willing to declare—in dubious circumstances--that a proposed
provision lacks “widespread applicability” and thus is not subject to the
complexity analysis requirement. The Joint Committee decided, for
example, that a proposed first-time homebuyers’ credit (with a phase-out
provision) was not subject to complexity analysis because it would not be
widely applicable. 110
In short, the structural reform approach has already been tried, and
has failed. The structural reform cannot serve as an adequate replacement
for the now-vanished computational complexity constraint, because
Congress can—and does—simply ignore the information provided to it by
the reform (in those cases in which it even receives the required
information). What is needed is not a structural reform, but a changing of
Congressional hearts and minds. I hope that is not a counsel of despair.
CONCLUSION
In the era of pencil-and-paper tax return preparation, Congress
refrained from imposing provisions of great computational complexity on
large numbers of taxpayers, out of concern that it was unreasonable to
require average taxpayers (or their paid preparers) to wrestle with
computationally complex provisions. As return preparation software
gradually replaced the pencil, the complexity constraint weakened and
eventually disappeared.
Congress has responded by imposing
unprecedented computational complexity on large numbers of taxpayers.
This would not be problematic, if the only objection to computational
complexity were the difficulty of performing the required calculations
without software. Unfortunately, computationally complex provisions
generally constitute bad tax policy for reasons other than computational
109. The IRS National Taxpayer Advocate (NTA) regularly discusses tax complexity in
her annual reports to Congress. See, e.g., National Taxpayer Advocate, 2008 Annual Report,
supra note 80, at 3–14. There is no indication, however, that this is intended as a substitute
for the Commissioner’s annual complexity reports. The NTA is distinct from the
Commissioner, complexity is just one of many issues addressed by NTA reports, and NTA
reports are not pursuant to the same legislative mandate as the Commissioner’s complexity
reports. I.R.C. § 7803(c)(2)(B) (2009) (requiring the NTA to report annually to Congress,
and including a list of topics to be addressed by the annual reports).
110. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 110-606, at 72 (2008) (Conf. Rep.) (indicating that the
Joint Committee on Taxation declined to provide a tax complexity analysis of a bill
containing a number of tax provisions, including a first-time homebuyer’s credit with a
phase-out, on the grounds that the bill contained no provisions of “widespread
applicability”).
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difficulties. Such provisions turn the income tax into a black box, the inner
workings of which are incomprehensible to the average taxpayer, thereby
undermining both the democratic legitimacy of the tax system and the
ability of taxpayers to engage in informed tax planning.
Structural reform—the mandating of “tax complexity analyses” of
existing law and proposed legislation—has been tried and has (predictably)
failed. In response to the demise of the complexity constraint, Congress
must develop a self-imposed constraint, an informal presumption against
the enactment (or survival) of computationally complex provisions of
widespread applicability. Its goal should be a set of income tax rules under
which anyone armed with basic arithmetical skills and a calculator, and
with no exotic items of income, deduction, or credit, could easily prepare
his or her own tax return with pencil and paper. This should be the goal not
because taxpayers will or should return to pencil-and-paper return
preparation, but because adhering to this standard ensures tax system
transparency, which is crucial for both the political legitimacy of the tax
system and for tax planning. It is far from clear that Congress, freed of the
complexity constraint in the TurboTax era, can summon the political will to
resist the lure of tax complexity. In that possibility, however, lies the only
hope for a computationally simpler income tax.

